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Abstract
We still know very little about the experience of violence in the so-called
“Maluku Wars” of 1999 to 2002, much less about the individual motivations that
led to such sustained and intense violence between neighboring communities of
Muslims and Christians. Nevertheless, since the beginnings of the communal
violence, observers have speculated on the conditions that might have produced
sufﬁciently intense feelings of insecurity and resentment among residents of
Maluku, and the political interests that might have cultivated and directed them
towards a religious Other. By way of understanding the genealogy of violence
in Maluku, this paper reviews four broad explanations: organized provocation
by strategic players at the national level; the increase in sectarian politics during
the collapse of the New Order regime and subsequent political reforms; inten-
siﬁcation of socio-economic competition between immigrants and indigenous
populations following the economic crisis of 1997; and the deepening of reli-
giosity under conditions of uncertainty associated generally with globalization
and more speciﬁcally with the national political transition and economic crisis
in Indonesia, as well as rumor and conspiracy theories that abound during the
break down of law and social order. The paper ﬁnally provides a description of
the process of reconciliation and prospects for future peace.
1 Introduction
In the absence of ethnographic research we do not yet know the
particular motivations of individual perpetrators of communal vi-
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olence in the so-called “Maluku Wars” that occurred from 1999
to 2002, and no doubt many Moluccans and others will be asking
themselves and their neighbors searching questions about their in-
volvement in the conﬂict for years to come. Nevertheless, there
are by now various accounts of the precipitant events, structural
interests, and historical processes that produced the conditions for
conﬂict, such that it is possible to identify several broad explana-
tory “stories”. This paper provides an overview of these sometimes
competing, sometimes complementary accounts, and also consid-
ers the process of reconciliation and prospects for sustained peace
by way of establishing a context for other papers in this special is-
sue of Cakalele.
Although there was an apparently related outbreak of street vi-
olence in Dobo, on January 15–17, 1999, the precipitant event of
the “Maluku Wars” is generally acknowledged in most “stories” to
have been a personal altercation between an Ambonese bus driver
and a Bugis passenger in Ambon, January 19, 1999, which rapidly
escalated to incorporate Christian and Muslim gangs from neigh-
boring communities. After several days of destructive urban riots
in the city, sectarian conﬂict spread rapidly throughout the island
of Ambon and Central Maluku, catalyzing further conﬂicts in Aru,
Kei, North Maluku, Tanimbar, Buru and even as far away as Lom-
bok. Although ﬁgures are still unreliable, it is estimated that 5,000–
9,000 people may have lost their lives in Maluku, from 300,000 to
700,000 were made homeless, and around 29,000 houses and hun-
dreds of mosques and churches were destroyed, in what has been
represented as “frenzied slaughter, savage mutilations, forced con-
versions, and the wanton destruction of property” (Schulze, 2002,
p. 57).
The Indonesian government, pre-occupied with an economic
crisis and political transition, and fearful of a Muslim backlash,
failed to intervene decisively to control the communal violence.
Factions of the government may even have helped foster resent-
ments and provoke confrontation. The military and police proved
inadequate to the basic task of repressing violence: different ser-
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vices and units were accused of bias, and of covertly supporting, or
even joining co-religionists in the conﬂict. Over time, the oppos-
ing sides became progressively better-armed and organized in prac-
tices of terror, but mediation and segregation of opposing com-
munities were still able to create periods of uneasy peace. This
tense situation continued more or less until the arrival in Ambon
and North Maluku of Laskar Jihad (“Warriors of the Holy Strug-
gle”) from Java in May 2000. Formed in response to devastating
attacks by Christian villages on neighbors in North Maluku, their
superior arms and training, and logistical support from the mili-
tary, escalated the conﬂict and reversed the relative fortunes of the
protagonists, especially in Kao and Kota Ambon where Christian
forces had enjoyed some territorial gains.
A state of emergency was declared in both Maluku and North
Maluku on June 26, 2000, and elite troops were sent to restore
security. Violence had generally declined by early 2001, as these
troops partitioned kota Ambon into Christian andMuslim canton-
ments, with clearly deﬁned and protected neutral zones of interac-
tion, and successfully battled Laskar Jihad throughout the province.
The appointment of new leadership, including Brigadier General
I Made Yasa, a Hindu, as commander of the Pattimura forces, and
the establishment of clear lines of command, also increased conﬁ-
dence in the neutrality of the security forces. The military’s mo-
tivation to secure Maluku also perhaps increased when parliament
replaced the moderate reformist president, Abdurrahman Wahid,
with nationalist Megawati Sukarnoputri, who enjoyed close ties
with senior army ofﬁcers, and certainly with international pressure
following the events of “9/11” in the United States and the Bali
bombing of October 2, 2002. Importantly, also, following the Bali
bombing, Ja’far Umar Thalib announced the disbanding of Laskar
Jihad, although ostensibly for “internal” and “moral” reasons.
The government-brokered Malino II peace accord was signed
on February 12, 2002, and the processes of paciﬁcation, disarma-
ment, return for Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) and recon-
ciliation of hostile communities has substantially progressed since
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then. The State of Civil Emergency was lifted in North Maluku
in May and in Maluku in September, 2003 and the curfew was
ﬁnally lifted in Ambon in September, 2003. Nevertheless, there
have been outbreaks of sporadic violence and communities remain
divided: some neighboring villages on Ambon island and in the
Lease Islands, for example, continue to attack each other, and Kota
Ambon is still a divided city, with a “neutral” zone separatingMus-
lim and Christian sectors.
2 The genealogy of violence
The apparently “run-of-the-mill” argument (Spyer, 2002, p. 24)
that sparked the riots in Ambon is, in fact, illustrative of the gen-
eral genealogy of sectarian violence in Indonesia. First, there is
a connection between so-called preman (“street thugs”) and disaf-
fected members of the national elite who have a strategic interest
in provoking violence. Second, both the gangs and the elites are
identiﬁed by religious afﬁliation, consistent with increasing seg-
mentation of civil society and factionalization of national politics.
Third, political and economic resources are distributed unequally
between the two respective segments, and the balance is chang-
ing rapidly due to “afﬁrmative action” in local government policies
and the effects of immigration and development. Finally, due to
the combined effect of the severe economic crisis that began in
1997, the transition from authoritarian rule that followed from the
resignation of Suharto in May 1998, the changing role of religion
in Indonesian society, and the generally ongoing processes of mod-
ernization and globalization, there was generalized sense of uncer-
tainty, insecurity, mutual suspicion, and sensitivity to rumor. In
this situation, religion and nationalism might provide some sense
of continuity and stability, but they are also all too easily exploited
by ideologues and transformed into a generalized sense of paranoia
and hostility towards threatening others.
Each of these causes alone can hardly account for the chaos un-
leashed in Maluku from 1999 to 2001, but if they are combined
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in dynamic ways with stories of individual motivations and per-
sonal experiences we might begin to understand how the “Maluku
wars” were generated and sustained. This is surely a vital ﬁrst step
towards mitigating or preventing this tragedy from recurring.
3 “Premanism”
Early in the conﬂict it was already apparently a “near-universal
belief ” (Human Rights Watch, 1999), that the violence in Am-
bon was part of a general conspiracy by “mysterious elements”
in Jakarta, which are variously identiﬁed as: “rogue” military el-
ements loyal to the Suharto family (Jubilee Campaign, 1999, p.
6); “entrenched military and economic interests” intent on desta-
bilizing the Wahid administration (Aditjondro, 2000a); “hardline
factions of the political elite” bent on derailing the process of polit-
ical reform (Hefner, 2001, p. 1); or senior military ofﬁcers intent
on diverting attention from the investigation of human rights vi-
olations in East Timor (Tomagola, 2000). Throughout the 1990s,
there were incidents of occasional violence between Christian and
Muslim youth in Jakarta (Turner, 2003, p. 260), and following
Suharto’s resignation in May, 1998, there were several incidents
throughout the country betraying telltale signs of organized provo-
cation by preman or “street thugs” (Human Rights Watch, 1999).
George Aditjondro (2000a) identiﬁes “delinquent Moluccans” in
co-religious Jakarta street gangs and their connections among dis-
affected military ofﬁcers and members of Suharto’s family or circle
of “cronies”. He claims that the gangs are employed as provoca-
teurs by a shadowy “Maluku operation” that includes: “disgruntled
generals” resisting reform of TNI (Tentara Nasional Indonesia or
“National Forces of Indonesia”), and particularly the relative loss
of power of the army due with the end of Dwifungsi (“dual func-
tion” i.e. both military and political); powerful businessmen who
control plantation and logging interests in the province; Muslim
groups opposed to the secularism of the Wahid presidency; and
ultimately, Suharto himself.
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What might in fact be taken to be the original precipitant of
the violence in Maluku—the “Ketapang Incident” in November
1998—was triggered by a ﬁght between a local Muslim youth and
a member of the Christian Ambonese “Coker”1 gang, at an enter-
tainment center within its territory in West Jakarta. When the gang
responded by publicly intimidating local residents and businesses,
they were engaged in running street battles by rival Muslim gangs,
and mobs destroyed Christian businesses and local churches. The
Coker gang lost territory and perhaps “hundreds” of its members
moved to Ambon, effectively exporting a turf war among rival
gangs and their respective “backers” toMaluku, where it was trans-
formed into religious violence (Human Rights Watch, 1999, p. 2).
Thus, when Christians gathered to protest the Ketapang Incident
in Kupang on November 30, rampaging mobs attacked Muslim
immigrants and mosques, and in December there was violence
between youth groups in Poso, Central Sulawesi, presaging the
serious inter-religious conﬂict that erupted there in April 2000.2
Following related gang violence in Dobo, the atmosphere in Am-
bon was tense as rival gangs, supported by co-religious youth in the
neighborhoods of ChristianMardika andMuslimBatuMerah pre-
pared to defend themselves against imminent attack. Everywhere
youth played an important role in the violence, and very often vio-
lence took the form of gang warfare, even to the extent that partic-
ipants were identiﬁed by their “colors”: “whites” for Muslims and
“reds” for Christians.
There are many reports of military involvement in assaults on
both sides, and even if most of this was opportunistic and uncoor-
dinated, as argued below, there is some evidence of that Kopassus
(Komando Pasukan Khusus or “Army Special Forces”), using tac-
1Originally derived from Cowok-Cowok Keren (“Handsome/Cool Boys”), or perhaps,
according to Aditjondro (Aditjondro, 2001), Cowok Kerempeng (“Skinny Boy”), the gang
was renamed during the conﬂict to Cowok-Cowok Keristen (“Christian Boys”) (Sholeh,
2003, p. 14, n. 9)
2Violence in Kupang was provoked by speech of retired Christian army ofﬁcer who is
alleged to have played a key role in Ambon.
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tics developed in East Timor, was behind Coker attacks on “neu-
tral” targets. These attacks may have been designed to re-kindle
community violence, even as peace and reconciliation progressed
through 2002 (AFP, 2003, Tapol, 2003). While it is easy to iden-
tify beneﬁciaries of the conﬂict in Jakarta, it is harder to provide
anything but circumstantial evidence of their direct involvement.
This is not sufﬁcient to prove the conﬂict in Maluku a “war by
proxy among the Jakarta elite” (Laksamana.net, 2002). If there is
widespread suspicion of organized provocation by strategic inter-
ests, but as Bartels (2000, pp. 2–3) argues, “it is unlikely that out-
side agitation alone could have provoked the bellicosity between
the two indigenous religious groups . . . if there was not already
a fertile ground for it to ﬂourish”. What was the nature of this
ground so ready for cultivation?
4 Sectarian politics
The New Order was particularly sensitive to the role of religion
in national politics and it systematically repressed political iden-
tities based on so-called SARA issues (Suku, Agama, Ras dan An-
tar golongan or “ethnic, religious, racial or tribal identities”). Reli-
gious afﬁliation was required of all citizens as a means to counter
communism, but the political potential of Islam, for example, was
carefully contained through promotion of the secular ideology of
Pancasila, management of political parties, discrediting of Islamic
organizations and leaders, and, when necessary, outright repres-
sion (Bertrand, 2004, p. 77). In fact, early in the New Order
regime, Suharto had strategically isolated Islamists by promoting
Christian and abangan (nominal and syncretist Muslim Javanese)
military ofﬁcers and technocrats, but when these “nationalists” be-
came critical of his corrupt regime and threatened his power, there
was a “ﬂip-ﬂop” in policy (Hefner, 2003, p. 13) which resulted
in the “greening” of the military and cabinet through the 1990s,
as symbolized by the rise of individuals like General Faisal Tan-
jung and B.J. Habibie. The inﬂuential ICMI (Ikatan Cendekiawan
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Muslim se-Indonesia or “Association of Indonesian Muslim Intellec-
tuals”) was founded in December 1990 in order to counter eco-
nomic marginalization of Muslims, while long established organi-
zations like Nahdlatul Ulama (“Revival of Scholars of Islam”) and
Muhammadiyah enjoyed a new found political inﬂuence under
the “new thinking” of modern “accommodationist” leaders such
as Abdurrahman Wahid and Amien Rais, respectively (Bertrand,
2004, p. 85). Through their inﬂuence the social presence and
civil role of Islam increased, as witnessed by the wearing of the
jilbab, greater numbers making the hajj pilgrimage, an increase in
mosque building, and the rise of Sharia banks and insurance com-
panies (Hasan, 2002, p. 162).
When modern moderate Muslim leaders, in their turn, be-
came critical of Suharto and embraced reformasi (democratic re-
form), Suharto turned to conservative religious organizations such
as KISDI (Komite Islam untuk Solidaritas Dunia Islam, or “Islamic
Committee for Solidarity with the Islamic World”), whose goals
include the propagation of Islam (da’wa) through civic action and
the institutionalization of Islamic law (sharia). The inﬂuence of
Wahhabism and Salaﬁ society had recently deepened in Indone-
sian Islam, in part due to education of a new generation of Mus-
lim leaders in Saudi Arabia, and a number of radical groups that
had emerged to promote these religious goals were also opposed
to secular processes of democratization, the decentralization of au-
thority to the regions, and the accounting of the military for hu-
man rights abuses (Hasan, 2002, pp. 149–151). Most signiﬁcant
for the conﬂict in Maluku is the FKAWJ (Forum Komunikasi Ahlus
Sunnah wal wal Jama’ah or “Communication Forum of the Follow-
ers of Sunnah and the Community of the Prophet”) which was
founded in February 1998 to promote “Islamic values” and Laskar
Jihad, its paramilitary military wing, formed by Ja’far Umar Thalib
in Yogykarta on January 30, 2000, explicitly to defend Muslims in
Maluku from religious persecution (Hasan, 2002, Schulze, 2002).
Even though then President Abdurrahman Wahid expressly for-
bade them from traveling to Maluku, up to 3000 trained Laskar
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Jihad warriors arrived on state-owned vessels unhindered, and in
fact abetted, by security forces.
In hindsight, we can see that the Suharto regime’s response
to its “legitimation crisis” effectively re-opened some very basic
questions on national identity, including the deﬁnition of national
boundaries, the role of Islam in national politics, the relative im-
portance of regional and central governments, and mode of rep-
resentation of ethnic groups (Bertrand, 2004, p. 3). The process
of reformasi intensiﬁed political and socio-economic uncertainty
that was exploited by political entrepreneurs in traditional Indone-
sian fashion: that is, by translating it into neo-aliran or sectarian
terms (Hefner, 2003, Bertrand, 2004, Brown, 1994), often result-
ing in ethno-religious conﬂict. Tadjoeddin (Tadjoeddin, 2002), for
example, documents a marked increase in the number and inten-
sity of incidents of mass violence throughout the archipelago im-
mediately following resignation of Suharto in May 1998.
The local effect of the political transition was to destabilize
established patronage networks and intensify the politicization of
ethnic and religious identities (Klinken, 1999, p. 2). In Maluku,
access to political resources has been deﬁned by religious afﬁlia-
tion since the colonial era, and indeed old resentments at the pref-
erential treatment of Christians by the Dutch, or the “collabora-
tion” of Muslims with the Japanese, have resurfaced in the context
of communal violence. The Christian elite has long dominated
provincial politics, and in Ambon a relatively large proportion of
the Christian population depends upon employment in the civil
service or upon government contracts (Klinken, 2001). Ostensi-
bly as a means to balance political representation, the province’s
ﬁrst Muslim governor, Saleh Latuconsina, upon appointment in
1992, began placing Muslims in positions of authority in his ad-
ministration, and recruited Muslim school teachers. Even if only
substantially cosmetic in effect, this lead to charges by Christians
of “Islamic nepotism.” The sense of political marginalization only
increased with the promise of democratic elections of local govern-
ment and decentralization of government authority International
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Crisis Group, 2000, p. 3). Meanwhile, the governor’s Christian ri-
val mobilized street gangs to from “a network motivated by mate-
rial gain but clothed in the language of religion” (Klinken, 1999, p.
3).
In North Maluku, the prospects of decentralization and the
creation of a new kecamatan (district) in North Halmahera intensi-
ﬁed ancient rivalries between the Sultanates of Ternate and Tidore
for control of territory and the governorship (Alhadar, 2000, p. 2).
The Sultan of Ternate supported his Christian clients in Kao in
their struggle against immigrants fromMakian, even deploying his
personal “yellow” troops in the conﬂict, while the Sultan of Tidore
supported the Regent and the mostly Muslim population of Cen-
tral Halmahera, backing a “white” militia which was formed in
response (Tomagola, 2000, p. 4). North Maluku too, provides
evidence that even following the peace agreements, interpersonal
political rivalries and neo-patrimonial politics at the village level
has frustrated reconciliation (Satriawan, 2003).
At the same time, Muhamad Najib Azca (2003) shows how
local security forces, their privileges threatened by reforms, their
morale and public image eroded, their operations hindered by poor
coordination between services, and their ranks divided by ethnic
and religious afﬁliation and loyalties to different leaders, neverthe-
less possessed sufﬁcient residual political resources to inﬂuence the
sectarian competition to their own ends. Whether its “rogue ele-
ments” initiated the conﬂict, the military was ineffective in stop-
ping violence during the ﬁrst 18 months, and indeed contributed
to it: their weapons and tactics under “shoot-to-kill” orders esca-
lated the death toll and the different services and units condoned
or actively supported actions of their co-religionists (International
Crisis Group, 2002, p. 1). In Ambon, for example, the military
was widely perceived to be partisan as relations between the Chris-
tian community and Korem Pattimura (“district military command”
) had become increasingly strained through the 1990s for a number
of reasons: ﬁrst, was a longstanding dispute between the command
and the GPM (Gereja Protestan Maluku or “Protestant Church of
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Maluku”) over land at its headquarters which it wanted to use to
build a mosque; second, there was resentment at the commander’s
overt support of the Muslim candidate for governor; and third,
was the legacy of the “Batu Gantung” incident of November 18,
1998, where the commanders responded heavy-handedly to a stu-
dent demonstration against Dwifungsi and the Semanggi shootings
in Jakarta, leading to public demands for their resignation by local
Christian leaders (Azca, 2003, p. 14).
Although local troops were roughly evenly split between Mus-
lim andChristian, reinforcements sent fromMakassar and Kostrad
(Army Strategic Command) not surprisingly sided with Muslims
in Ambon city, a signiﬁcant proportion of whom are BBM, a some-
times pejorative term for migrants from South Sulawesi (Bugis,
Buton and Makassar). Aditjondro (Aditjondro, 2000a, p. 3) sug-
gests, moreover, that leaders of these forces were close to General
Wiranto, and by implication to the conspiratorial “Maluku Opera-
tion”, a claim reinforced by the fact that somemembers of the mil-
itary deserted their units and are suspected to have joined combat-
ants in advisory and logistical roles. The police were also said to be
“contaminated” by religious afﬁliation: Polda (Polisi Daerah, or “Po-
lice Regional Command”) and the special forces Brimob (Brigade
Mobil or “Mobile Brigade”) in Ambon, for example, were accused
of siding with local Christians, while Polres (Polisi Resort, or mu-
nicipal police) was accused of supportingMuslims. It has also been
suggested that regardless of religious of unit, service or religious
afﬁliation, individual troops from the various services in Ambon
may have tolerated, if not encouraged, continuing violence in or-
der to obtain protection money from their clients (International
Crisis Group, 2002, p. 1).
The escalation of violence inMaluku helped strengthen the po-
litical position of the military as a whole during a period when the
national government was moving towards civilian control and it
was used to justify the maintenance of the territorial command
structure that ensures a military presence at every administrative
level of society, from provincial down to district, sub-district and
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village levels, in order to defend the territorial integrity of NKRI
(Negara Kesatuan Republik Indonesia or the “Unitary State of the Re-
public of Indonesia”). Accused of forming shadow governments,
sometimes more powerful than the civilian administration, and of
corruption and criminality in order to generate revenue, territo-
rial commands were argued to be redundant once the police were
separated from the Indonesian armed forces in April 1999 (Tapol,
2002). In fact, however, in May 1999, the military re-established
the previously dismantled an area command, Kodam Pattimura,
a prelude to the formation of Kodam Iskandar Muda in Aceh, in
February 2002, and the announcement of plans for new kodam in
Central and South Kalimantan and West Papua.
The security situation in Maluku dramatically improved with
the arrival of “Yongab” (Battalyon Gabungan or “Joint Battalion”),
consisting of crack riot troops from three military services. Ac-
cused of harassment and excessive use of force, Yongab troops nev-
ertheless succeeded in stabilizing the situation by effectively crip-
pling Laskar Jihad in several confrontations in 2001. It is suggested
that with Wahid gone, there was increasing willingness of mili-
tary to end violence, since Megawati Sukarnoputri enjoyed good
relations with senior military ofﬁcers, although, again, “rogue” el-
ements are suspected to be behind the sporadic outbreaks such as
the attacks in Soya in April 2002, the bombing of Mardika mar-
ket in July 2002, and the bombing of Lapangan Merdeka soccer
stadium in September 2002 (Sholeh, 2003, p. 11).
5 Immigration and socio-economic competition
If the transition from authoritarian to more democratic rule is of-
ten accompanied by nationalist and ethno-religious conﬂicts, due
to the renegotiation of national identity, the breakdown of the ca-
pacity of government, and resistance by entrenched power hold-
ers (Snyder, 2000, p. 310), so also the general process of global-
ization produces economic and political insecurities that weaken
ties of community and lead to renegotiation of regional and lo-
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cal identities (Brown, 2000). Throughout Indonesia during the
1990s, sporadic outbreaks of violence attested to increased tension
between social groups, and often the ﬁrst targets were the socio-
economic activities of minorities in the form kiosks, stalls, stores,
and vehicles, as well as government ofﬁces. In Maluku the com-
bined effect of political transition, monetary crisis of 1997, legacies
of uneven economic development, populationmigration, modern-
ization, and conﬂicts over land at the regional and local level, inten-
siﬁed competition over government controlled jobs and resources,
and led to the political mobilization of identity based on particu-
laristic notions of rights and entitlements.
In North Maluku, the cumulative resentment of Christian res-
idents in an area south of Kao on Halmahera towards Muslim
residents who had been resettled from the island of Makian in
the 1970s, exploded into violence with the issue of a central gov-
ernment decree in August 1999 that created the new kecamatan
(“district”) of Malifut. Although originally conceived as a tempo-
rary relocation during a threatened volcanic eruption, the 30,000
Makianese transmigrants have long cultivated land within the an-
cestral territories of Kao villages, which they now claim as their
own without compensation to the mostly Christian Kao people.
As well as competing with rural Kao as farmers, Makianese run
successful businesses and occupy inﬂuential positions in civil ser-
vice in Ternate. The new district, whose name is a Makianese
word, is has a Muslim majority but contains a number of predom-
inantly Christian Kao and Pagu villages. The indigenous popula-
tion resents the perceived favoritism and government subsidies to
the newcomers, particularly given that the new district contains a
potentially lucrative gold mine. What seems a clear case of ma-
terially based social conﬂict, however, was transformed into re-
ligious violence once displaced Makianese mobilized support for
their cause by evoking the specter of “ethnic cleansing” in Kao and
called for a “Jihad” against Christians (Alhadar, 2000, International
Crisis Group, 2000).
Throughout Maluku, long-term spontaneous migration from
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South Sulawesi, and to a lesser extent, sponsored transmigration
from Java, has progressively transformed the demographic balance,
such that Christians are no longer the majority population: the
province had a Christian majority in the early 1970s but is now
roughly 54% Muslim. In Central Maluku, Christians Ambonese
for example, have been displaced from many sectors of the econ-
omy by more competitive immigrants and BBM migrants, in par-
ticular, now dominate commercial life of kota Ambon, especially
the transportation sector. While Christians retained prominence in
civil service and police, recent employment policies of the provin-
cial government favor Muslims, including non-Moluccans. In ru-
ral areas, especially on the islands of Seram, Buru and Halmahera,
indigenous populations resent the preferential treatment given by
the national government to sponsored transmigrants who are over-
whelmingly Muslim. In many cases, too, land disputes involving
migrants, or longstanding rivalries between neighboring indige-
nous villages over boundaries and resources have motivated vio-
lent conﬂict, prompting Bartels (Bartels, 2000, p. 13) to claim
that “much of the ﬁghting between Moslem and Christian Am-
bonese may only be fought under the pretext of religious differ-
ences but is in actuality a struggle for the increasing scarcer re-
sources of villages—land”.
The shifting ethno-religious balance, as well as the reforms
of village administration in 1979, the modernization of protestant
Christianity (especially the elimination of ancestor worship), the
puriﬁcation of Islam under the inﬂuence of the Muhammadiyah
movement, and the general expansion of education opportunities,
have also contributed to the progressive undermining of traditional
authority structures in Maluku (Dean, 2002, p. 4) (Bartels, 2000,
pp. 9–10). Several authors argue that adat institutions once en-
sured peaceful coexistence of Muslim and Christian communi-
ties (Turner, 2003, p. 242) (Bartels, 2000), and especially the pela
relationship of the Ambonese culture area (Ambon, Lease Islands,
and West Seram). Pela is a ceremonial alliance between villages,
which establishes mutual obligations to assist in times of crisis
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and in communal projects such as the construction and repair of
church and mosque (Bartels, 1977, Cooley, 1967). Although only
a minority of such relationships is between villages of different re-
ligious adherence, and pela only ever describes speciﬁc inter-village
arrangements, not a generalized kinship between all Ambonese re-
gardless of religion, it has been romanticized in both popular and
academic accounts. For example, as recently as 1998, then Pres-
ident Habibie used it as the basis of his claim that Maluku pro-
vided the nation with a model of religious tolerance, and Bartels
(2000, p. 8) argues that “because of the existence of the pela sys-
tem, any potential antagonism between Ambonese Moslems and
Christians was held to a minimum, as opposed to internecine strife
so common between the adherents of these religions throughout
the world.” While it not clear the degree to which pela is the re-
sult, rather than cause, of relative religious tolerance in Ambon, it
seems likely that the generalized decline of indigenous beliefs and
practices under modernization contributed to the loss of power
of village leaders who traditionally would be asked to contain and
mediate conﬂict.
On the other hand, some observers can recall occasional alter-
cations and the desecration or destruction of religious buildings in
the recent past, that with the beneﬁt of hindsight suggest merely
a relative quiescence in the ancient rivalry for political control of
territory between religious communities in Maluku (see (Andaya,
1993)), rather than an state of harmony. Umar Tuasikal (Tuasikal,
2000), an Islamic activist from Java, argues that the Muluku con-
ﬂict is a continuation of Christian crusades and modern imperi-
alism, part of a historical project to convert Muslims and appro-
priate their resources. Similarly, Brigadier General Rustam Kas-
tor (Kastor, 2000, p. 103), retired commander of Unpatti Korem,
native Moluccan, an inﬂuential Islamic ideologue in the Maluku
conﬂicts, similarly identiﬁes a conspiracy involving the remnants
of the RMS (Republik Maluku Selatan or “South Maluku Repub-
lic”) in the Netherlands, the GPM, and the local chapter of the
“Christian-Nationalist” PDI-P, which he claims is part of a global
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Jewish-Christian conspiracy against umat Islam. In this view, the
Christianization of Maluku is prelude to broader goals of creating
a Christian state incorporating the “Golden Triangle” of Maluku,
North Sulawesi and Irian Jaya (Fealy, 2001, p. 2) (Bubandt, 2003,
p. 17) and ultimately of subjugating the world’s most populous
Muslim society (Turner, 2003, p. 262). In such accounts the pref-
erential treatment of Christian Moluccans under Dutch colonial-
ism, and their role as “BelandaHitam” (“black Dutch”) in the KNIL
(Koninklijk Nederlandsch-Indisch Leger or “Royal Dutch East Indies
Army”), are “festering wounds” that remain a primary source of
resentment (Schulze, 2002, p. 57). As a result the struggle for
independence is represented not only as anti-colonial, but anti-
Christian (Kastor, 2000, p. 95), and is used to evoke the racial prej-
udices of Javanese against “primitive” Melanesians (see (Aditjon-
dro, 2000b, p. 2). Even though Muslims participated in short lived
RMS when it was declared in 1950, it is derisively referred to as
Republik Maluku Serani (“Republic of Christian Maluku”) and as-
sociated with the contemporary protestant church. The conﬂation
of separatism and religion enables Laskar Jihad, for example, to
identify as an “Islamic nationalist” organization formed to defend
both the unity and integrity of the Indonesian state and Islam.
Early in the conﬂicts, Christians were more likely to identify
immigrants and political provocateurs as immediate sources of vi-
olence, but when Jakarta failed to intercede—such as when Pres-
ident Wahid stated in 1999 that the Ambonese should solve their
own problems (Schulze, 2002, p. 65)—they too identiﬁed a larger
conspiracy against them. The Forum Kedaulatan Maluku (“Maluku
Sovereignty Forum”), founded in December 2000 in response to
Laskar Jihad, stated in its “Declaration of Independence” (Maluku-
FKM, 2000), for example, that “the Human tragedy that occurs
in the Moluccan islands in the past two years was the result of
a collaboration and conspiracy organized by the Indonesian gov-
ernment by using the Indonesian Army and the Jihad vigilantes
as a means to fossilize the Moluccan people.” Yet some Christian
spokespersons worked to exorcise the ghost of separatism, evok-
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ing indigenous (Alifuru) identity as a means of uniting indigenous
Moluccans (Turner, 2003, p. 254), whether Christian or Muslim,
against outside agitators and combatants, just as North Maluku’s
Christians appealed to indigenous identity of the “ethnic groups”
of Tobelo, Galela, Kao and Sahu (Bubandt, 2003, p. 10). However,
when FKM leaders raised the RMS ﬂag on April 25, 2001, the an-
niversary of its independence proclamation—even if most Chris-
tians were opposed to separatism and the FKMwas not exclusively
Christian—they only fulﬁlled the fears of many Indonesians, and
as much as Laskar Jihad, demonstrated the powerful relationship
between the ideals and symbolic systems of nationalism and reli-
gion (Peterson and Walhof, 2002, p. 9) (Rapoport, 1992, p. 126).
6 Religiosity
So far in this overview, I have considered some of the conditions
for competition and conﬂict between communities in Indonesia
and Maluku, and how these were exploited by strategic economic
and political interests. It is harder, however, to understand the feel-
ings of vulnerability and betrayal, and what Patricia Spyer (2002)
calls the “climate” of suspicion that provides the immediate mo-
tivational basis for violent action. As Timmer (Timmer, 2003, p.
5) puts it: “What remains obscure is what it is that made individ-
uals able [to] kill, to rape, and to put themselves in positions in
which they could easily get killed. What kind of intimate personal
and crowd feelings and forces operated to ready people to engage
in abnormally horrifying acts and put their own lives at stake?”
This is a question that many individuals involved in conﬂict will
themselves surely have a hard time answering, but some evidence
is available in the form of books, pamphlets, letters, web pages and
internet messages. These documents attest to the persistent po-
tency of mythical representations of ancestry and homeland, and
the role of paranoiac and apocalyptic discourses whose reproduc-
tion works to project collective social anxieties onto a common
ethno-religious enemy (Turner, 2003, p. 244) (Brown, 2000, p.
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25) (Bubandt, 2001). But why is religion such an effective “screen”
for this projection and how exactly was religiosity experienced in
the “Maluku Wars”?
It has been remarked that observers from secular traditions gen-
erally ﬁnd it difﬁcult to acknowledge the degree to which differ-
ent logics and moralities affect behavior in religious communi-
ties (Selengut, 2003, p. 6), and they consequently underestimate
the degree to which religion underwrites violent conﬂict on its
own terms (Appleby, 2000, p. 30). Richard Fox (Fox, 1999, p. 4),
observing the media treatment of the violence in Maluku, noticed
how early “sensational” reports on co-religionists spontaneously
“running amuck”, were replaced by more distanced analyses of
structural interests organizing against the order of the nation state,
evidence of “an implicit theory of human action according to which
people do not really act on the basis of ’religious’ motivation.”
Academic observers, too, tend to downplay the role of religion
in the conﬂict, insisting that what appears to be a religious war
is upon closer analysis “really” motivated by socio-economic, po-
litical and territorial grievances that are mobilized and manipu-
lated by political interests and agents provocateur (see, for exam-
ple, (Schulze, 2002, Klinken, 1999, Aditjondro, 2000a, Aditjondro,
2000b, Hefner, 2001)). We do not have to agree entirely with Rus-
tam Kastor (2000), for example, that “this is a religious war,” or
Agus Wattimena, leader of Coker, that “this is a real religious war”
(quote in International Crisis Group, 2000, p. 15), but nether
should we dismiss the “religious” justiﬁcations of violence by those
involved in the conﬂict as evidence of “false consciousness”. In
short, “violence in God’s name” is not simply a spurious cover for
grievance or greed (McTernan, 2004).
Religious feeling plays such an important role in communal
conﬂict because its confessional loyalty translates into clearly de-
ﬁned and durable community and its model of faith counters ra-
tional calculation and enlightened self-interest, cultivates a righ-
teous sense of persecution, and provokes a passion against evil that
fuels the excesses of group hatred (Appleby, 2000, p. 4) (Gaylin,
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2003, p. 228). Although religions are indeed manufactured or
invented within particular historical and political contexts (Mc-
Cutcheon, 1997, Peterson and Walhof, 2002), their creeds are rep-
resented as fundamental truths, providing some security in times
of uncertainty, and countering the challenges of relativism and sec-
ularism of late modernity (Appleby, 2000, pp. 57–61). Moluccan
communities have for centuries been deﬁned in terms of religious
adherence, and even in urban Ambon, the geographical mixing and
social intermixing of populations is limited, so the religious Other
is easily discriminated. As we have seen, the historical origins and
experiences of the religious communities are distinct, and the cur-
rent conﬂict could be presented as continuous with an older com-
petition and conﬂict, as well as with a modern struggle on a global
scale: the so-called “clash of civilizations” (Huntington, 1996). If
Maluku had once seemed a model of religious tolerance, the con-
ﬂict was represented and experienced in terms ofManichean strug-
gle between Muslims and Christians: FKAWJ’s homepage, for ex-
ample, was entitled “Jihad in Ambon: Victory or Matyrdom”, and
even without a declaration of “Holy War,” Christian combatants
could aver that “there are only two options—to die or to kill the
enemy” (quoted in Schulze, 2002, p. 63).
World religions, and Abrahamic religions in particular, also pos-
sess a stock of martial metaphors and military imagery and promise
reward for violent sacriﬁce. The concept of some transcendent
authority—the “will of god”—which translates into the absolute
authority of church ofﬁcials, and religious myths of election (the
“chosen-ness” of a people) and persecution, provide a powerful al-
ternative to the delusional formation of paranoia which transforms
victim-hood into vengeful action (Gaylin, 2003, p. 115) (Smith,
1999). Religion potentially translates secular differences between
a particular “us” and “them”, the known and the unfamiliar, onto
the cosmic plane and thus into a moral struggle between the amor-
phous forces of order and chaos, and good and evil, for which the
ultimate sacriﬁce—murder or martyrdom—is possible (Jurgens-
meyer, 1992, p. 114). In the case of Maluku, for example, fatwa
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were issued by clerics in Saudi Arabia and Yemen, and Christians
in Maluku were identiﬁed as kaﬁr harbi (belligerent inﬁdels), the
most dangerous category of non-Muslims who may be killed with
religious blessing. If public statements by leaders of the Christian
communities were generally more tolerant, the churches widely
distributed exaggerated images of their victimization, as evidenced
in their sophisticated web presence through sites such as Ambon
Berdarah Online, Masariku Network, and Crisis Center of the
Diocese of Ambon (see (Lim, 2003, Bruchler, 2003)), while lay
leaders pushed increasingly fundamentalist interpretations of the
conﬂict, particularly following the arrival of Laskar Jihad and in-
crease in Christian losses (Sholeh, 2003).
Finally, religion provides the concept of a “sacred territory” and
a set of ready material and symbolic targets whose attack provokes
intense feelings: hence mosques and churches were desecrated and
destroyed, sacred texts and beliefs were ridiculed, prophets were
slandered, and other symbols of faith violated. The attacks by Hitu
villagers on Christian neighbors early in the conﬂict in Ambon,
for example, were in response to rumors of the violation of the
main Al-fatah mosque, while the cause of Laskar Kristus (“Chris-
tian Warriors”) gained signiﬁcant momentum after the destruction
of the oldest church on the island at Silo in December, 1999. Re-
ligious calendars are also evoked: it is no coincidence that January
19, 1999, the date violence began in Ambon was the day of the
Idul Fitri celebration; and Christians so feared that Muslims in To-
belo and Galala were conspiring to create a “Bloody Christmas”
that they preemptively attacked villages and slaughtered hundreds
of Muslims sheltering in a mosque in December 1999, an act that
directly provoked the formation Laskar Jihad.
This latter example illustrates the power of paranoia in a climate
of suspicion, where each side fears that the other is secretly plot-
ting betrayal, and so engages in what Patricia Spyer (2002, pp. 35–
36) calls a “hyper-hermeneutics,” or “discourse of hidden depth”
such that people desire to make meaning out of mundane things
under crisis conditions where they can, in fact, “see” very little at
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all. On the other hand, it is perhaps not surprising that following
decades of “conspiratorial statecraft” and upon the sudden free-
dom of political expression, “conspiracy had become a pervasive
and legitimate form of political explanation” within in Indonesia
politics during the 1990s (Bubandt, 2003, p. 18). In Maluku, as
elsewhere in the country, anonymous pamphlets circulated as part
of a “paranoid discourse” that, told of a far-fetched conspiracy by
an opposing group and/or atrocities committed in its name, and is-
sued a call for retaliatory action (Bubandt, 2003, p. 8). In Maluku,
provocative rumors of beheading, disembowelment, immolation,
bloody excision of live fetuses, and forced conversions circulated
by word-of-mouth, pamphlets and web-sites. In some cases there
is evidence of sophisticated intention, such as a pamphlet in Am-
bon that claimed the governor planned to replace 38 Christian civil
servants (Klinken, 2001, p. 18) and the infamous Sosol Berdarah
(“Bloody Sosol”) “can letter”—named after the Pagu village where
violence ﬁrst began in North Maluku—which told of a spurious
plan by the Christian church to “make war and murder in most
sadistic ways imaginable” (quoted in (Bubandt, 2003, p. 10) and to
eliminate Makianese from Halmahera as a prelude to a takeover of
the island (see Alhadar, 2000, p. 1).
These examples return us to consideration of the role of orga-
nized provocation in communal violence, the point at which our
analysis of the causes of the “Maluku Wars” began. Although there
is much that we still do not understand, we can conclude that the
communal violence is the product of complex causation involv-
ing the experience of socio-economic insecurity and unresolved
historical resentments that, combined with opportunistic leader-
ship, resulted in the intensiﬁcation of nationalism and religiosity,
ultimately igniting passions sufﬁcient to sustain bloody sectarian
conﬂict over more than three years.
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7 Reconciliation and prospects for peace
It is widely reported that the people of Maluku, having suffered
“war weariness” and having been alienated by “extremist” orga-
nizations such as Laskar Jihad and FKM, soon became receptive
to gestures of reconciliation. There is still some distrust between
communities, and only a few of those who incited and perpe-
trated violent crimes have been brought to justice, but people have
mostly resisted the violent provocation by “outsiders” that still oc-
curs periodically and there are signs that everyday life is returning
to some measure of normalcy. Many IDPs have returned to their
villages, damaged infrastructure is being repaired, erstwhile ene-
mies are interacting in integrated retail and transportation services,
and important symbolic gestures of unity have been made.
Arguably, the most important step towards reconciliation was
the government sponsored Malino II peace accord reached by rep-
resentatives of Muslim and Christian organizations in February
2002. Finally taking decisive action, the Coordinating Minister for
People’s Welfare convened meetings which established an eleven-
point agreement to end conﬂict, restore the rule of law, protect
the unitary state, establish freedom of movement, eliminate armed
organizations, return displaced persons to their homes, rebuild in-
frastructure, maintain neutrality of security forces, and reconstruct
an integrated university. There is some question about whether
delegates were truly representative of the people of Maluku and
whether the commissioners appointed by the government to in-
vestigation the conﬂict will be able to maintain impartiality due
to their closeness to government authorities. Polls show a signiﬁ-
cant minority of the population (20%) were opposed to the agree-
ment (Pinontoan, 2002), as were organizations such as the FKM
and Laskar Jihad, Front Pembela Islam Maluku (“Maluku Front of
Muslim Defenders”), and Satgas Amar Maruf Nahi Munkar (“Spe-
cial Task Force of Amar Maruf Nahi Munkar”) which united in
opposition in the Forum Silahturami Umat Islam se-Maluku (“All-
Maluku Islamic Friendship Forum”) (Kompas, 2002, FKAWJ, 2002).
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Muslim opposition was based in particular upon a demand for for-
mal acknowledgement that Christians were to blame for initiat-
ing the violence, while Christian organizations rejected the use
of the term “Laskar Kristen” as well as the label “separatist”. It is
also true that Malino II is typical of what Ichsan Malik calls the
government’s “ﬁre engine” approach, in which distant authori-
ties represent themselves as “saviors in local conﬂicts” and impose
top-down, “instant” solutions that frustrate local initiatives (Malik,
2003). Even then, progress on some of the goals has been slow, due
to lack of political will and funds, and representatives of the provin-
cial parliament even threatened to sue the National Government
for “liable negligence” in its failure to fully implement the agree-
ment. Most importantly, however, Malino II demonstrated clear, if
belated, concern of the central government at the ministerial level
and established the authority and responsibility of the civil secu-
rity forces. Following the end of the Civil Emergency, the military
presence visibly reduced and weapons amnesty and regular sweeps
have led to disarmament of militias, creating an opportunity for
representatives of civil society to continue or initiate efforts at rec-
onciliation and reconstruction.
Perhaps most signiﬁcant in regard to reconciliation has been the
sustained efforts of Baku Bae3 and related NGOs to broker meet-
ings between opposing sides, beginning with select meetings of
provincial leaders in Jakarta in mid-2000, and expanding progres-
sively to include forty civil society leaders in Bali in October, and
over one hundred adat leaders, youth group representatives, NGO
activists, and “war leaders” in Jogyakarta in December, 2000. These
meetings on neutral ground outside the province established dialog
between opposed factions and led to the establishment of neutral
zones within Ambon, including the temporary campus of Unpatti
(Unversitas Unpatti, or Pattimura University). Unpatti hosted an
important meeting in January 2001 of over one hundred raja, orga-
3Baku bae is slang in Ambon Malay for “saling (bersikap) baik”, or “good to one an-
other”.
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nized by Baku Bae and facilitated by Sultan Hamengku Buwono X
from Yogyarkata which resulted in an agreement to better integrate
educational opportunities in Maluku, a commitment later incor-
porated into the Malino II accord. Baku Bae also facilitated meet-
ings of Muslim and Christian journalists in Bogor in March 2001,
which resulted in a neutral “Media Center”, located in the neu-
tral zone of Mardika in Ambon, and of Maluku lawyers in Jakarta
in January 2002. Baku Bae lost some of its momentum when the
organization split due to a leadership conﬂict, but it successfully
brokered meetings between the military and local communities,
resulting in vital improvement in relations and cooperation on se-
curity.
Similarly, the Go-East Institute from Jakarta, with the coop-
eration of the Crisis Centre of the Diocese of Amboina and local
government, organized a symposium in Kei in March, 2001 called
“National Dialogue on Revitalizing Local Culture for Rehabilita-
tion andDevelopment in the Moluccas towards a New Indonesia.”
Attended by almost 1500 regional leaders, this meeting issued a call
for traditional leaders or Bapa Raja to play an instrumental role and
advocated “the use of local traditions as a meeting point for accom-
modating the interest of the different groups in the province”. Al-
though the meeting had limited impact beyond Southeast Maluku
due to the relative weakness of tradition elsewhere, it highlighted
the potential contribution of adat institutions in conﬂict avoidance
and mediation.
International NGOs, in collaboration with local counterparts,
have also played an important role in reconciliation and recon-
struction. Mercy Corps, for example, provides not only emer-
gency needs, but works to strengthen inter-community relations
through cooperative self-sufﬁciency projects and capacity building
activities (Mercy Corps, 2004). One of its most important con-
tributions was the establishment a mixed Muslim and Christian
ofﬁce in Ambon in May 2001, enabling it to more effectively work
across the lines of conﬂict. It also created an NGO resource cen-
ter that became a neutral zone for communication between Mus-
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lim and Christian NGOs, which now cooperate in projects such
as service provision and the recent clean-up campaign in the city.
This neutral zone further attracted other local and international
NGO ofﬁces, and also a spontaneous neutral market that was then
developed with subsidy from the municipal government.
The maintenance of genuinely interactive neutral zones as op-
posed to the “no-man’s land” between communities that is pro-
tected by a heavy military and police presence is vital to recon-
ciliation as they allow the peaceful interaction of communities in
pursuit of their self-interest and everyday needs. Neutral zones in
Ambon, for example include: several integrated produce markets
and more recently Ambon Plaza Mall where Christians are now
tentatively shopping;4 efforts have also been made to recruit stu-
dents to mixed high schools and vocational schools—the so-called
“reconciliation schools”—as well as to the alternate Unpatti cam-
pus; a mixed Maluku Media Center was established in Septem-
ber 2001 to bring together journalists from different communi-
ties and to mitigate the polarization of the local press; mixed buses
have begun to ply roads from Ambon to neutral transfer points
such as Nania near Christian Passo on the isthmus between pre-
dominantly Christian Leitimor and Muslim Leihitu, while there
are plans to integrate ports such as Tulehu which services Cen-
tral Seram and the Lease Islands; and recreation facilities such as
Lapangan Merdeka soccer stadium and even beaches and resorts,
as steps have been taken to promote local and even international
tourism (Maluku Media Center, 2003).
While we argued above that religion contains violence in the
sense that sacred texts and practices promote intolerance and en-
dorse sectarian conﬂict, religion also potentially contains violence
in another sense—in that it issues injunctions to compassion and
acknowledges the sanctity of human life (see McTernan, 2004).
4Ironically, the economic effects of the conﬂict have meant that Christians who pre-
viously eschewed jobs in the informal retail trade and transportation services, now have
both the motivation and opportunity to become traders and becak riders for their segre-
gated community.
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Moderate religious leaders have drawn upon these resources to
facilitate reconciliation between the sectarian communities. For
example, the GPP Maluku (Gerakan Perempuan Peduli or “Caring
Women’sMovement of Maluku”), originally established in August
1999 as a Christian organization, recruited Muslim women lead-
ers, at ﬁrst secretly, in order to collaborate on information cam-
paigns, trauma counseling, and training workshops for mothers
and youth, in the hope of indirectly and directly reaching those
who are particularly vulnerable to provocation. Also of symbolic
signiﬁcance is the concurrent reconstruction of neighboring Silo
Church and An’Nur Mosque on neutral road outside of Ambon,
and other collaborative efforts to repair religious buildings draw-
ing upon the tradition of pela. Recent secular examples include
the restoration of the famous sasi lompa ceremony on Haruku (Ru-
maruson, 2004) and the Pukul Sapu (“brush whipping”) festival in
Mamala, Ambon (Ambom Expres, Dec. 3, 2003).
Progress has been made on the return of IDPs, but many re-
main in camps unsure whether their communities are safe. There
is a severe housing problem, with as many as 64,000 families still
homeless (Nurbaiti, 2003). Most of these are in camps established
in Ambon, Ternate and Sulawesi, but squatting is endemic in ur-
ban shop houses and government ofﬁces. In other cases, people
cannot return to their homes, even if their neighbors will accept
them, either because they have been destroyed or because they
are occupied by others. Sometimes the new occupants are them-
selves displaced from their villages, and speculative settlers demand
“guarding fees” for the right of return. Government built housing
has proven inadequate and corruption has plagued assistance pro-
grams. Baku Bae representatives even express fear that property
disputes will “new source of conﬂict” (in Nurbaiti, 2003).
Finally, while repair of infrastructure and economic develop-
ment is of prime importance in restoring everyday life in Maluku,
activists stress the importance of investigation into the origins of
the violence and the role of security forces as a means to restore
public conﬁdence in the government (Malik, 2003). Cases are
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being established against both Muslim and Christian troops in-
volved in the violence, but they may be scapegoats and it is hard
to believe any of senior ofﬁcers involved in the “Maluku Opera-
tion” will be brought to justice. While leaders of the FKM have
been successfully prosecuted for inciting followers to hoist sepa-
ratist ﬂags on the anniversary of the RMS declaration in April 2002,
Ja’far Umar Thalib was acquitted by East Jakarta District Court of
charges of inciting hatred of government and fomenting religious
violence—in fact the judge even commended him for seeking to
maintain national integrity (Laksamana.net, 2003). With national
elections approaching later this year it is clear that the government
still lacks the political will and capacity to confront radical Islam,
a step which is surely necessary to restore conﬁdence among the
people of Maluku.
Civil society has rapidly consolidated the peace in Maluku over
the last two years, and the hope is that lessons have been learned
that will ultimately strengthen it. If peace, in the negative sense,
that is as “absence of conﬂict” between communities, was main-
tained by a coercive, centralized developmentalist state under the
“New Order,” peace in the positive sense, that is as “the pres-
ence of justice”, will depend upon a strong, or at least secure, de-
centralized state that promotes civic nationalism. The economic
crisis and the uncertainties of succession have undermined citi-
zens’ conﬁdence in Indonesian state and in patrimonial politics.
In order to restore that conﬁdence in Maluku, the central gov-
ernment will have to fulﬁll its promise of regional development
and decentralization, and at the same time to accommodate po-
litical Islam without its elements of fundamentalism. It may yet
also prove necessary for the government in Jakarta to prosecute
“rogue” elements among senior army ofﬁcers and corrupt mem-
bers of Jakarta’s political elite who were involved in the violence
in order for the people of Maluku to become invested in a new
model of civic nationalism, and have faith in the capacity and will
of the state to maintain security and promote prosperity necessary
to sustain positive peace.
34 CAKALELE, VOL. 11
REFERENCES
Aditjondro, G. 2000a. The political economy of vio-
lence in Maluku, Indonesia. Munindo (Munchen-
Indonesia). URL
.
Aditjondro, G. 2000b. The tragedy of Maluku. URL
.
Aditjondro, G. 2001. Guns, pamphlets and handie-talkies: how the
military exploited local ethno-religious tensions in Maluku to
preserve their political and economic privileges. In Violence in
Indonesia, ed. by Wessel, I and Wimhofer, G. Hamburg: Abera
Verlag Markus Voss.
AFP. 2003. Lawyer says Indonesian soldiers helped attacks by
Christian gang. AFP, Jan 8. URL
. Accessed November 12, 2003.
Alhadar, S. 2000. The forgotten war in North Maluku. Inside
Indonesia, 63. URL
.
Andaya, L. 1993. The world of Maluku. Honolulu: University of
Hawaii Press.
Appleby, R. S. 2000. The ambivalence of the sacred: religion, violence,
and reconciliation. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littleﬁeld.
Azca, M. N. 2003. The landscape of the security forces in the con-
ﬂict in Ambon: from the national panorama to the local pic-
ture. Paper presented at the conference on Sectarian Violence
in Eastern Indonesia: Causes and Consequences. University
of Hawai’i, May 16–18.
Bartels, D. 1977. Guarding the Invisible Mountain: Intervillage Al-
liances, Religious Syncretism and Ethnic Identity among Ambonese
Christians and Moslems in the Moluccas. Phd dissertation, Cor-
nell University.
Bartels, D. 2000. Your god is no longer mine: Moslem-Christian
fratricide in the Central Moluccas (Indonesia) after a half-
UNDERSTANDING THE “MALUKU” WARS 35
millennium of tolerant co-existence and ethnic unity. URL
.
Bertrand, J. 2004. Nationalism and ethnic conﬂict in Indonesia. New
York: Cambridge University Press.
Brown, D. 1994. The state and ethnic politics in Southeast Asia. Lon-
don: Routledge.
Brown, D. 2000. Contemporary nationalism: civic, ethnocultural and
multicultural politics. New York: Routledge.
Bruchler, B. 2003. Cyberidentities at war: religion, identity, and
the internet in the Moluccan conﬂict. Indonesia, 75:123–151.
Bubandt, N. 2001. Malukan apocalypse: themes in the dynamics
of violence in Eastern Indonesia. In Violence in Indonesia, ed. by
Wessel, I and Wimhofer, G. Hamburg: Abera Verlag Markus
Voss.
Bubandt, N. 2003. Pamphlets, rumors and the politics of para-
noia in North Maluku. Paper presented at the conference on
Sectarian Violence in Eastern Indonesia: Causes and Conse-
quences. University of Hawai’i, May 16–18.
Cooley, F. 1967. Village government in the Central Moluccas. In-
donesia, 7:139–63.
Dean, G. 2002. Ethno-religious conﬂict in Maluku. URL
. Accessed
on October 11, 2002.
Fealy, G. 2001. Inside the Laska Jihad. Inside Indonesia, 65. URL
. Accessed
October 7, 2002.
FKAWJ. 2002. Umat Islam Maluku siap membela nkri. URL
. Ac-
cessed October 7, 2002.
Fox, R. 1999. Conﬂict@ambon.net. URL
. Accessed on February 19, 2003.
Gaylin, W. 2003. Hatred: The psychological descent into violence. New
York: Public Affairs.
Hasan, N. 2002. Faith and politics: the rise of the Laskar Jihad in
the era of transition in Indonesia. Indonesia, 73:145–169.
36 CAKALELE, VOL. 11
Hefner, R. W. 2001. Muslim-Christian violence in Maluku:
the role of national politics. URL
. Paper presented for
the United States Commission on International Religious
Freedom, Hearing on the Maluku Islands, Washington D.C.,
February 13, 2001.
Hefner, R. W. 2003. Violence past and the future of indonesia.
Paper presented at the conference on Sectarian Violence in
Eastern Indonesia: Causes and Consequences. University of
Hawai’i, May 16-18.
Human Rights Watch. 1999. Indonesia: the violence in Ambon.
URL .
Huntington, S. 1996. The clash of civilizations and the remaking of the
world order. New York: Simon and Schuster.
International Crisis Group. 2000. Indonesia: Overcoming mur-
der and chaos. Asia Report 10, International Crisis Group,
Jakarta/Brussels.
International Crisis Group. 2002. The search for peace
in Maluku. URL
. Ac-
cessed November 11, 2004.
Jubilee Campaign. 1999. Analysis of the sectarian conﬂict in
Maluku and its role in the Islamicization of Indonesia. URL
. Accessed
October 11, 2002.
Jurgensmeyer, M. 1992. Sacriﬁce and cosmic war. In Violence and
the sacred in the modern world, ed. by Jurgensmeyer, M. London:
Frank Cass.
Kastor, R. 2000. Fakta, data, dan analisa konspirasi RMS dan Kristen
menghancurkan umat Islam di Ambon-Maluku. Yogyakarta: Wih-
dah Press.
Klinken, G. v. 1999. What caused the Ambon violence? Inside
Indonesia, 60.
Klinken, G. v. 2001. The Maluku wars: Bringing society back in.
Indonesia, 71:1–26.
UNDERSTANDING THE “MALUKU” WARS 37
Kompas. 2002. Diragukan, kredibilitas tim investigasi Maluku.
Kompas, Jun 16.
Laksamana.net. 2002. Ambon: Battleﬁeld for Jakarta players. URL
.
Accessed October 7, 2002.
Laksamana.net. 2003. Laskar Jihad chief acquitted. URL
. Accessed
October 9, 2003.
Lim, M. 2003. Cyberspace to cyberscythe: Meta-narratives and
conﬂict in Eastern Indonesia. Paper presented at the confer-
ence on Sectarian Violence in Eastern Indonesia: Causes and
Consequences. University of Hawai’i, May 16-18.
Malik, I. 2003. Deliver promises to prevent further violence.
Jakarta Post, Oct 28.
Maluku-FKM, F. K. 2000. Press release.
URL
. Ac-
cessed March 3, 2002.
Maluku Media Center. 2003. Security personnel still alert: Am-
bon beaches back to normal. URL
.
McCutcheon, R. 1997. Manufacturing religion: the discourse on sui
generis religion and the politics of nostalgia. New York: Oxford
University Press.
McTernan, O. 2004. Violence in God’s name: religion in an age of con-
ﬂict. London: Darton, Longman and Todd.
Mercy Corps. 2004. Developmental relief: An integrated ap-
proach. URL . Accessed
February 25, 2004.
Nurbaiti, A. 2003. Home is still far away for Maluku
refugees. Jakarta Post, Oct 13. URL
. Accessed January
10, 2004.
Peterson, D. R and Walhof, D. R. 2002. Rethinking religion. In
The invention of religion: rethinking belief in politics and history, ed.
38 CAKALELE, VOL. 11
by Peterson, D. R and Walhof, D. R. New Brunswick, NJ:
Rutgers University Press.
Pinontoan, O. 2002. Peace elusive in Maluku despite accord.
Jakarta Post, Nov 3.
Rapoport, D. C. 1992. Some general observations on religion and
violence. In Violence and the sacred in the modern world, ed. by
Jurgensmeyer, M. London: Frank Cass.
Rumaruson, R. 2004. Four years disappeared: Sasi lompa tra-
dition restarted in Haruku. Maluku Media Centre. URL
.
Satriawan, B. 2003. Tracking changes: going home with Maluku
refugees. Kabar-Indonesia, Dec.
Schulze, K. E. 2002. Laskar Jihad and the conﬂict in Ambon. Brown
Journal of World Affairs, 9(1):57–69.
Selengut, C. 2003. Sacred fury: Understanding religious violence. Wal-
nut Creek, CA: Altamira Press.
Sholeh, B. 2003. Violence in the name of god: Muslims and Chris-
tians’ views of the Ambon conﬂict. Paper presented at the con-
ference on Sectarian Violence in Eastern Indonesia: Causes
and Consequences. University of Hawai’i, May 16-18.
Smith, A. 1999. Ethnic election and national destiny: some re-
ligious origins of nationalist ideals. Nations and Nationalism,
5:331–355.
Snyder, J. 2000. From voting to violence: democratization and national
conﬂict. New York: W.W. Norton.
Tadjoeddin, M. Z. 2002. Anatomy of social violence in the context of tran-
sition: The case of Indonesia 1990-2001. Jakarta: United Nations
Support Facility for Indonesian Recovery.
Tapol. 2002. The military and the arrogance of power. In-
donesia Human Rights Campaign Bulletin Online 166/7. URL
. Accessed January 21,
2003.
Tapol. 2003. Kopassus and the maluku crisis. Indonesia
Human Rights Campaign Bulletin Online 169-170. URL
. Accessed January
UNDERSTANDING THE “MALUKU” WARS 39
21, 2003.
Timmer, J. 2003. Towards an intimate account of the 1999-
2002 Ambon conﬂicts, Maluku, Indonesia. Paper presented
at the conference on Sectarian Violence in Eastern Indonesia:
Causes and Consequences. University of Hawai’i, May 16-18.
Tomagola, T. A. 2000. The bleeding ofHalmahera of northMoluc-
cas. URL . Paper from
the Workshop on Political Violence in Asia, Oslo, 5-7 June
2000.
Tuasikal, U. 2000. Quo vadis modus operandi anta umat beragama di
Ambon. Jakarta: Himpunan Keluarga Muslimin Maluku.
Turner, K. 2003. Myths and moral authority in Maluku: the case
of Ambon. Asian Ethnicity, 4(2):241–263.
